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A large literature seeks to account for the diﬀerent evolution of aggregate labor market
outcomes between Europe and the US over the last thirty years. Prescott (2002, 2004)
and Rogerson (2005) demonstrate that changes in taxes can account for a substantial
part of the diﬀerences in changes of hours worked between the US and the economies
of Continental Europe over this period.1 While their calculations lend credence to
the argument that tax rates are a prime cause of Europe’s distinctive labor market
outcomes vis-a-vis the US, one source of skepticism is that the tax explanation does
not look so promising when one expands the set of countries beyond this group. In
particular, the Scandinavian countries have tax rates at least as high as those found in
Continental Europe, yet have much higher hours of work. If one focused exclusively on
the economies of Scandinavia and Continental Europe, one would presumably be lead
to the conclusion that tax rates themselves are not likely to be particularly important
in accounting for diﬀerences in hours of work.
This paper argues that the evidence on tax rates and hours of work in Continental
Europe and Scandinavia should not be interpreted as negative evidence on the mech-
anisms emphasized by Prescott (2002, 2004) and Rogerson (2005). The argument is a
very simple one: the elasticity of hours worked with regard to tax rates is very much
dependent on how tax revenues are spent, and the distinctive features of Scandinavian
government spending programs can account for much of the apparently diﬀerent eﬀects
of taxes in Scandinavia. I illustrate this point in two diﬀerent contexts. The ﬁrst con-
text assumes a standard aggregate framework similar to that used by Prescott (2004)
in which there is a representative household and a single consumption good. Prescott
assumed that all revenues returned to households took the form of a lump-sum transfer.
I show that it matters whether tax proceeds are returned to households as a lump sum
transfer versus a manner in which the size of the transfer is aﬀected by the amount of
labor supplied, or spent in ways that do not inﬂuence the consumers marginal utility of
consumption. For example, it matters whether higher taxes fund disability payments
which may only be received when an individual does not work, subsidies for day care
for working mothers, or unnecessary jobs in the public sector. I show that holding tax
rates constant, these compositional changes can have signiﬁcant quantitative eﬀects.
The second context is motivated by the observation that diﬀerences in employment
across the US, Scandinavia and Continental Europe in the recent cross-section are almost
completely accounted for by diﬀerences in employment in the service sector. The second
model also assumes a representative household but assumes that there are two diﬀerent
goods, one that will be interpreted as a general consumption good, and the other that
will be interpreted as family services, consisting of child care and family services. What
matters in general is that this second good has a high spending elasticity with respect
1In a diﬀerent context, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) also emphasize the role of taxes in understanding
European labor market developments.
1to taxes because it has good nonmarket substitutes. In this model I show that even if
the government uses taxes to fund lump-sum transfers, it matters a lot which good the
government transfers if individuals must consume the transfer. Intuitively, high taxes
cause particularly large decreases in market hours in those activities which have good
nonmarket substitutes. But if the government uses tax revenues to fund transfers of
these same goods, then it directly oﬀsets some of the largest negative eﬀects of higher
taxes on hours of market work. In models with a single good this channel obviously
does not exist.
These ﬁndings can help us understand the diﬀering outcomes in Scandinavia and
Continental Europe. Speciﬁcally, I emphasize two key diﬀerences in how revenues are
spent in the two regions. The ﬁrst is the much higher rate of government employment
in Scandinavia relative to either Continental Europe or the US. If government employ-
ment serves as an implicit transfer program in which an individuals receive payments
but does not produce something that individuals value, then this will serve to decrease
the negative eﬀects of taxes on hours of work. The second is that a much larger share of
government spending is devoted to family services such as child care and elderly care.
As just discussed, this will also increase hours of work in Scandinavia relative to Conti-
nental Europe. The higher employment rate in services found in Scandinavia relative to
Continental Europe is also consistent with this economic logic precisely because of the
fact that the government provides a transfer of market services to households, thereby
increasing the volume of activity in the market service sector.
An outline of the paper follows. In the next section I document the diﬀerent evo-
lutions of labor market outcomes in three diﬀerent sets of economies: the US, four
economies from Continental Europe (Belgium, France, Germany and Italy), and four
Scandinavian economies (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). Section 3 presents
a benchmark one-sector model of labor supply and taxes, and argues that such a model
has diﬃc u l t yi na c c o u n t i n gf o rt h ed i ﬀering outcomes across the three sets of economies.
Sections 4 and 5 develop the two extensions described earlier and carry out some illus-
trative quantitative calculations. Section 4 extends the one sector model to consider
a wider array of government spending programs and assesses the quantitative eﬀects
of variation in spending programs. Section 5 extends the analysis to a multi-sector
model and assesses the role of variations in the allocation of government transfer pay-
m e n t sa c r o s st h ed i ﬀerent goods. The quantitative analysis suggests that the distinctive
features of Scandinavian government spending can account for much of the diﬀerences
found in the data. Section 6 concludes.
This paper is related to several others in the literature. As already noted, it com-
plements the analyses of Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2005) by trying to reconcile
taxes as the dominant driving force behind diﬀerences in hours worked with the obser-
vations for Scandinavia. It complements the work of Rosen (1996), who emphasized the
distinct nature of Scandinavian government spending, by embedding it into a general
equilibrium analysis and assessing its quantitative implications for hours worked. It
2is also closely related to two recent papers by Olovsson (2004) and Ragan (2005) on
hours worked in Scandinavia. Similar to the approach here, Olovsson stresses diﬀer-
ences in government spending and the importance of home production. But diﬀerently
than the analysis here, he does not explicitly model Scandinavian social policies, nor
compare Scandinavia with Continental Europe. The work of Ragan is the closest to the
work carried out here. Her analysis, developed independently from that here, diﬀers
with regard to various details, but is very similar in spirit to the material in Section
5 of this paper. In particular, she also explicitly considers Scandinavian social policies
and contrasts outcomes in Scandinavia with those in both the US and other European
countries.
2. Evolution of Hours Worked
This section contrasts the evolution of hours worked across three groups of countries:
the US, Continental Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy), and Scandinavia
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). In each case I compute the simple average
across the countries within each group. The data used in this analysis are annual
and come from two databases: the OECD and the GGDC (Groningen Growth and
Development Center). My measure of hours worked is total hours of market work
divided by the size of the population aged 15-64. Total hours worked is constructed as
the product of civilian employment with a series for annual hours of work per person
in employment. The series for employment and population aged 15-64 come from the
OECD database, and the series for annual hours worked per person in employment
comes from the GGDC.2 I construct this series for each country from 1956-2003. In
addition to presenting aggregate data, I will also present information at the sectoral
level. Sectoral employment data covers 1960-2000 and is from the OECD data base.
Because the emphasis of the analysis is on longer term trends, in what follows I focus
on the trend components of the series, which are extracted using the HP ﬁlter with a
smoothing parameter of 100.
2.1. Evolution at the Aggregate Level
In this subsection I contrast the evolution of aggregates across the three sets of countries.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of aggregate hours per person of working age.
This ﬁgure shows that as of 1956, hours worked are roughly equal in Continental
Europe and Scandinavia and lowest in the US. Over time, hours decrease at a fairly
steady rate in both Continental Europe and Scandinavia, leveling oﬀ later in the period,
but the decrease is more pronounced in Continental Europe. In contrast, the hours of
2For three of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) the OECD employment
series is missing some values during the ﬁrst six years, and I have used values from the GGDC series
to ﬁll in the missing data. The GGDC employment series has values for 1950 and 1960, so the missing
values were ﬁlled in by linear interpolation.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate Hours Worked
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Figure 2.2: Hours Worked Relative to the US
work in the US are relatively ﬂat for the ﬁrst part of the period, but then increase
between 1980 and 2000. To better illustrate the changes in relative hours worked across
the three sets of countries it is useful to look at hours worked relative to the US, which
is shown in Figure 2.2.
This ﬁgure shows that in both cases the decline in relative hours worked continues
at a steady rate through to the mid 1990s, at which point they level oﬀ. In 1956, hours
worked are roughly 10% higher in each region compared to the US, while in 2003 hours
worked in Scandinavia and Continental Europe are only about 80% and 70% of the US
level.
Although the analysis later in the paper will not consider the separate margins of
employment and hours per employee, it is of interest to note the patterns in the two.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the evolution of each margin separately in the three regions.
The interesting feature to note in these pictures is that as of 2003, Continental
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Figure 2.3: Employment to Population Ratios
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Figure 2.4: Annual Hours Worked Per Person in Employment
5Europe has a signiﬁcantly lower level on both margins than the US, whereas Scandinavia
looks like the US in terms of employment to population, and like Continental Europe in
terms of annual hours of work per person in employment. Note also that annual hours of
work per person in employment decreases in all three regions, whereas the employment to
population ratio increases signiﬁcantly in the US, modestly in Scandinavia and decreases
modestly in Continental Europe.
2.2. Evolution at the Sectoral Level
Rogerson (2004, 2005) shows that the decline in employment in Continental Europe
relative to the US exhibits a marked pattern at the sectoral level. Speciﬁcally, as of
2000, virtually the entire gap in employment rates between Continental Europe and the
US is accounted for by diﬀerences in the employment rates in services. In view of this,
we next consider the evolution of employment at the sectoral level for the three sets
of economies. We focus on the evolution of sectoral employment rates, deﬁned as the
ratio of sectoral employment to the population aged 15-64, rather than sectoral hours,
since complete series on hours per worker are not available at the sectoral level. The
OECD data provides a breakdown into agriculture, industry and services for the period
1960-2000.
Rogerson (2004, 2005) notes that one must be careful when comparing sectoral
employment rates across economies to take into account the structural transformation
that accompanies the process of development. Speciﬁcally, as noted by Kuznets (1967),
poor economies devote most of their resources to producing agricultural products. As
they develop they ﬁrst move resources out of agriculture and into both industry and
services. Later, they enter a phase in which resources are moved out of both agriculture
and industry and into services. It follows that if countries are at diﬀerent stages of
development then one should expect the sectoral distribution of employment to also
diﬀer. In the current context this is important because in 1960, both Scandinavia and
Continental Europe lag the US in the development process, but by 2000 they have
largely caught up, as measured by output per hour.
The next three ﬁgures show that all three sets of economies do indeed experience
the process of structural transformation as described by Kuznets. For expositional ease,
these ﬁgures aggregate the agriculture and industry sectors.
In all three cases we see that the employment rate in agriculture plus industry
declines over time while the employment rate in services increases. However, while this
same qualitative feature is found in the evolutions for all three sets of economies, there
are some interesting diﬀerences as well. One can see these more clearly if one compares
the European evolutions to the US evolutions, so the next two ﬁgures show the sectoral
employment rates for both European regions relative to the values in the US.
We see that as of 1960, both European regions have higher employment rates in agri-
culture plus industry and lower employment rates in services. Given that in 1960 both
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Figure 2.5: US Structural Transformation
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Figure 2.6: Continental Europe Structural Transformation
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Figure 2.7: Scandinavia Structural Transformation
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Figure 2.8: Continental Europe Structural Transformation Relative to the US
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Figure 2.9: Scandinavia Structural Transformation Relative to the US
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Figure 2.10: Relative Sectoral Employment Rates in Europe
of these regions lag the US in the development process, this pattern is not surprising.
However, since both regions largely close the gap with the US in terms of productivity
over the next forty years, holding all else constant we would expect that the distribution
of employment across sectors would approach the distribution found in the US. When
we look at the evolution of the relative employment rates in agriculture and industry
combined, we see evidence of convergence to the US level in both cases. In continental
Europe the employment rate in these sectors drops from 1.45 of the US value in 1960,
to almost 1 in 2000. For Scandinavia the ratio falls from around 1.55 to 1.1. In services
we see a diﬀerent pattern. While in Scandinavia the ratio goes from .82 to .93 (after
reaching 1 in the early 1980s), the relative employment rate in services in Continental
Europe is basically ﬂat at .73.
It is also revealing to compare the sectoral employment rates between the two Eu-
ropean regions. This is done is Figure 2.10, where we plot the values in Continental
Europe relative to Scandinavia.
The fact that the 1980s are a strong decade for employment growth in Scandinavia
creates some “cyclical” movements during this period, but the trend behavior depicted
in the ﬁgure is that the relative employment rates in agriculture and industry combined
are roughly constant, whereas in services there is a substantial decline in Continental
Europe relative to Scandinavia.
2.3. Summary
The key patterns depicted above can be summarized as follows. First, in both European
regions, aggregate hours of work exceed the US level by about 10% in 1956, and fall
relative to the US at a fairly steady pace until the mid 1990s. Second, the decline
in Continental Europe exceeds the decline in Scandinavia—as of 2003 hours of work in
Scandinavia relative to the US are about .82, while for Continental Europe the value
9is .68. Third, while the evolution of sectoral employment rates in the three economies
exhibit similar qualitative patterns, a major anomaly is the service employment rate in
Continental Europe relative to the other two sets of economies. The gap in hours worked
between Scandinavia and Continental Europe in 2000 is almost entirely accounted for
by the lower employment level in services in Continental Europe.
3. Taxes and Hours Worked—A Benchmark One Sector Analysis
This section uses a standard one-sector representative agent framework to assess the
implications of a benchmark case of government tax and spending policies on hours
of work. Although the model below can be cast as the steady state analysis in a
representative agent version of the standard growth model, for expositional purposes I
will abstract from capital accumulation and therefore focus on a static version of the
model.3
3.1. Model
There is a representative household with preferences deﬁned over consumption (c) and
leisure (1 − h) given by u(c,1 − h). The function u is assumed to have the standard
properties: it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing in both arguments, concave
in c and (1−h) jointly, and strictly concave in each argument separately. The individual
is endowed with one unit of time. There is a production technology that uses labor to
produce the single good. This technology is assumed to be constant returns to scale,
and we furthermore choose units so that one unit of labor produces one unit of the
consumption good. We assume a governme n tt h a tl e v i e sap r o p o r t i o n a lt a xτ on labor
income and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance a lump sum transfer T to households.
I solve for the competitive equilibrium for this economy. The optimization problem
of the household is:
maxu(c,1 − h) (3.1)
s.t. c =( 1− τ)h + T
c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
This leads to a ﬁrst order condition:
(1 − τ)u1((1 − τ)h + T,1 − h)=u2((1 − τ)h + T,1 − h) (3.2)
3The results obtained here are identical to those that would emerge from a steady-state analysis in
the standard growth model.
10Substituting the government budget constraint τh = T into the household’s ﬁrst order
condition yields:
(1 − τ)u1(h,1 − h)=u2(h,1 − h) (3.3)
This condition completely characterizes the equilibrium value of time devoted to market
work as a function of the tax rate τ.
3.2. Quantitative Assessment
Prescott (2004) can largely be reinterpreted as a quantitative assessment of the extent
to which the above framework with varying levels of τ can account for diﬀerences in
labor input in the US and several European countries, both in the cross section and
over time. Given that there are some slight diﬀerences in the exercises, I report results
for the current model.4
Preferences are restricted to be of the form: u(c,1 − h)=αlogc +( 1− α)
(1−h)1−γ
(1−γ) .
The ﬁrst order condition then becomes:
α(1 − τ)
h
=( 1− α)(1 − h)−γ (3.4)
which simpliﬁes to:
h
(1 − h)γ =
α
1 − α
(1 − τ) (3.5)
To assess the quantitative signiﬁcance of these tax and spending policies on time
devoted to market work I calibrate the model to match features of the US economy
and then consider the implications for changes in tax rates holding all of the preference
parameters ﬁxed. Following Prescott (2004), I take τ = .40 to correspond to the US
tax rate, and take h =1 /3 as the fraction of discretionary time devoted to market
work. Given a value of γ this can be used to infer a value of the parameter α.T h e r e
is considerable controversy over the appropriate value of γ in this type of exercise. In a
dynamic setting this parameter describes the willingness of the household to intertem-
porally substitute leisure. Many studies using micro data conclude that this willingness
is very small for prime aged married males, while other studies have found much larger
values for married females.5 Rogerson (2006) argues that existing evidence from micro
data is likely to be of little use in determining the relevant elasticity to study the con-
sequences of changes in aggregate tax rates. Speciﬁcally, in the micro data much of the
4Prescott (2004) carries out his analysis in the context of the growth model, and as a result hours
worked in any given period depend both upon current conditions as well as expected future conditions.
In his analysis the ratio of current consumption to output enters into the analysis since it captures the
inﬂuence of future factors. One issue is that diﬀerences in c/y might be due to factors other than taxes
on labor.
5A recent paper by Imai and Keane (2004) incorporates learning by doing and ﬁnds a much higher
estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
11variation in wages is idiosyncratic. Given the need to coordinate working times across
individuals, one would not expect much response of individual hours to idiosyncratic
wage changes.6
Table 1 shows the relative time devoted to market work associated with various tax
rates higher than the 40% value used for the US, for several diﬀerent values of γ.R e c a l l
that α is recalibrated for each value of γ.
Table 1
Market Work Relative to τ = .40
τ γ =1.00 γ =2.00 γ =3.00 γ =5.00 γ =10.00
.45 .94 .96 .97 .98 .99
.50 .88 .91 .93 .95 .97
.55 .82 .86 .89 .92 .95
.60 .75 .80 .84 .88 .93
.65 .68 .74 .79 .85 .91
.70 .60 .68 .73 .80 .88
Note that the reductions for the γ =1 0case are only about 30% as large as the
changes for the γ =1case. Obviously the value of γ is signiﬁcant in terms of assessing
the quantitative signiﬁcance. Prescott (2003) concentrated on the γ =1case in present-
ing his results. While this value may be at the upper end of the reasonable range, given
that we are interested in aggregate labor supply here and not simply that of prime aged
married males, the other extreme would seem to be a value of around γ =3 .W h i l e
the magnitudes still vary within this range, a 20% increase in taxes is seen to have a
considerable impact for all values of γ within this range.
3.3. Application to Continental Europe and Scandinavia
We now examine the cross-country patterns described in Section 2 in light of the above
calculations. Speciﬁcally, we ask to what extent the above model can account for the
aggregate changes in hours of work across the US and Europe with taxes as the main
driving force. An important ﬁrst step is to ascertain the changes in tax rates across
countries over time. Mendoza et al. (1994) provide a method to compute average tax
rates on consumption, capital income and labor income based on available data. Data
limitations prevent this method from being applied prior to 1970 for most countries.
For the countries being studied here, there are estimates of these tax rates through
1991. Prescott (2003) modiﬁes the procedure of Mendoza et al. somewhat to deter-
mine marginal tax rates on consumption and labor income. He concludes that eﬀective
marginal tax rate on labor income (i.e., the combined eﬀect of taxes on labor income
and consumption, given by 1 − (1 − τl)/(1 + τc) where τl and τc are the marginal tax
rates on labor income and consumption respectively) has been constant at about .40 in
the US since 1970. For France, Germany and Italy he ﬁnds that this tax rate increased
6See also Prescott (2006) for a discussion of this issue.
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Figure 3.1: Current Receipts of Government/GDP
from about .45 in the early 1970s to about .60 in the early 1990s. Using the Mendoza
et al. numbers for 1990, the average eﬀective tax rates in the US, Continental Europe
and Scandinavia are .33, .52 and .57 respectively. This leads one to conclude that tax
rates in Scandinavia are somewhat higher than those in Continental Europe.7
Given the data limitations in obtaining long time series for eﬀective marginal tax
rates and the diﬃculties inherent in deriving these measures, it is also of interest to
consider other series that may proxy for changes in eﬀective tax rates. One such proxy
is the share of total resources controlled by the government. To pursue this we examine
the behavior of current receipts of government relative to GDP, which is available from
the OECD as far back as 1960.8 The data used here comes from various issues of the
OECD publication Historical Statistics.9
Figure 3.1 plots this series for each of the three sets of economies, and displays four
features worth noting.
First, this plot largely conﬁrms the earlier conclusions based on the 1990 data on
average tax rates, namely that tax rates are on the order of about 5% higher in Scandi-
navia than in Continental Europe. Second, government receipts were basically the same
in both European regions in 1960, at which point they were modestly higher than in the
US. Third, government receipts have increased dramatically in both European regions
since 1960, but even more so in Scandinavia than in Continental Europe. Fourth, there
has been little change in these series since the late 1980s.
Having looked at relative changes in tax rates over time across the three regions we
7It is worth noting that several of the European countries, perhaps most notably Sweden, have
reduced marginal tax rates since 1990. An important issue is how long it takes for individuals to
perceive tax changes as permanent and adjust their behavior accordingly.
8Analysis of the series for total outlays of government relative to GDP yields similar ﬁndings.
9This data is available for 1960 and then 1968 through 2000. I linearly interpolate to get the values
for 1961-1967. Given that the analysis is focused on trends this should not raise any issues.
13now ask whether these changes can account for the observed changes in aggregate hours
of work. On the positive side, relative tax rates increase in both European regions
relative to the US, leading us to expect that hours of work should decrease in both
regions relative to the US. However, on the negative side it should be apparent that
our simple model faces two diﬃculties. First, in 1960 there are higher tax rates in
Europe than the US, but hours worked are higher in Europe. While this is a challenge
for a tax-only story, Rogerson (2005) shows how this pattern can be accounted for by
the fact that Europe lags the US in terms of development in 1960 in a model with
non-homothetic preferences.
But the second, and more serious diﬃculty is that whereas tax rates increase by
more in Scandinavia than in Continental Europe, the hours worked decrease by less in
Scandinavia than in Continental Europe. Put somewhat diﬀerently, if taxes are the main
cause of the diﬀerences in hours worked in the US and Continental Europe in 2000, then
the model implies that there must be some other very signiﬁcant factor that explains why
Scandinavians are working so much compared to Continental Europeans. Or conversely,
if taxes are the main reason why Scandinavians work less than Americans, then there
must be some other very signiﬁcant factor that explains why Continental Europeans
work so much less than Scandinavians. The next section argues that a richer model
of government tax and spending programs can potentially account for hours worked
diﬀerences across all three sets of economies.
4. A Closer Look at Taxes, Government Spending and Hours of Work
The benchmark model of Section 3 assumed that all government revenues are rebated
lump sum to the household. While this simple abstraction may be suﬃcient for capturing
much the eﬀect of government tax and spending levels on hours of work, I argue here
that it may also abstract from some dimensions that are empirically important.
4.1. Four Types of Government Spending Programs
This subsection considers four diﬀerent ways in which government revenues may be spent
and contrasts the eﬀects of these spending programs on hours of work for a given tax
rate. While each of these programs is somewhat stylized, I argue below that they capture
important aspects of real world programs. The ﬁrst program is the program analyzed
in Section 3, and corresponds to the case in which all tax revenue is rebated as a lump-
sum transfer. It should be noted that there are several variants of this program which
are identical from the perspective of their implications for hours of work. Speciﬁcally,
the outcomes for allocations are identical independently of whether the government
transfers purchasing power to individuals, buys goods at the market price and transfers
these goods to individuals, or hires workers and produces output using the economy’s
technology and then transfers the output to individuals. Examples of this ﬁrst type of
program might include items such as education and health services.
14The deﬁning feature of the ﬁrst program is that government revenue is used to pro-
vide the consumer with something that is a perfect substitute for private consumption.
The deﬁning feature of the second program is the opposite case: government revenue
is used to provide something which at the margin has no impact on the marginal util-
ity of a unit of private consumption. Again, there are several variations on this which
are equivalent from the perspective of equilibrium hours worked. For example, it does
not matter if the government uses the tax revenue to purchase the consumption good
at the market price and then throws it away, or uses the tax revenue to purchase a
good that is of value to the consumer but does not aﬀect the marginal utility of private
consumption, or hires workers at the market wage to produce something that is of no
value to consumers. Military expenditures are often thought to be a good example of
this type of spending.10 But it is possible that much public sector employment ﬁts this
description.11
The two programs just described have the feature that the transfer that a given indi-
vidual receives from the government is not aﬀected by any decisions that the individual
takes, in particular, how much they choose to work. The next two programs consider the
case in which the transfer that an individual receives is explicitly or implicitly aﬀected
by how much he or she works. The third program assumes that the government subsi-
dizes consumption at the margin.12 In our formulation of this program we assume a per
unit subsidy of s. We note that in the single good model being used, a marginal subsidy
to consumption is equivalent to a marginal subsidy to working. Relevant examples of
such programs include subsidized child care or elderly care, or child care transfers that
are conditional on working.
The fourth program that we consider is modelled as a marginal subsidy to leisure.
In particular, we assume a per unit subsidy on leisure that we denote by b (for beneﬁt).
Many government spending programs implicitly provide a marginal subsidy to leisure,
since they stipulate that the beneﬁt is conditional on the individual not working, or
that the beneﬁt will be reduced in response to any labor income. Relevant examples
include some components of social security, unemployment insurance, traditional welfare
programs, and disability.
Table 2 summarizes the four diﬀerent types of programs.
10In fact, Prescott (2004) did distinguish between military and nonmilitary spending in his analysis.
11Of course, it is possible that adding unnecessary bureaucracy will also have negative eﬀects on
productivity, though we do not consider that margin here.
12In this case the transfer implicitly depends on how much the individual works because any income
that is earned must be spent on consumption in this model, and hence the more an individual works
the larger is the transfer that they receive.
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Program Description Examples
1 Lump-sum transfer education, health care
2 Wasteful spending military, unnecessary public employment
3 Subsidy to leisure UI, disability, SS
4 Subsidy to work child care for working mothers
A simple intuitive analysis serves to illustrate why the nature of government spending
programs matters in addition to the marginal tax rate on labor income when assessing
the eﬀects on hours of work, and to motivate the above taxonomy of spending pro-
grams. From the perspective of an individual’s labor supply decision, there is a natural
three-way classiﬁcation of spending programs: those where the amount received by the
individual is independent of how much they work, those in which the amount that the
individual receives is negatively inﬂuenced by how much they work, and those in which
the amount that the individual receives is positively aﬀected by how much they work.
Intuitively we expect that varying the form of the transfer would impact on the amount
of work that the individual chooses to do. While Programs 1 and 2 both correspond
to a case where the amount received by the individual is unaﬀected by how much they
work, they diﬀer because under Program 1 the individual receives a positive transfer
while under Program 2 they eﬀectively receive a zero transfer. This also turns out to
be an important dimension.
For each program it is straightforward to derive an equation that completely char-
acterizes the equilibrium value of h. As we did earlier for Program 1, one simply derives
the ﬁrst order condition for the household and then substitutes the government budget
constraint into this equation. For completeness we repeat the equation that corresponds
to Program 1:
(1 − τ)u1(h,1 − h)=u2(h,1 − h) (4.1)
As noted, Program 2 is equivalent to a program in which the government simply buys
consumption at the market price and then throws it away. The derivation is therefore
like that for Program 1, except that we now set T =0 ,a n dw eo b t a i n :
(1 − τ)u1((1 − τ)h,1 − h)=u2((1 − τ)h,1 − h) (4.2)
For Program 3, the individual budget equation is now (1 − s)c =( 1− τ)h.T h e
government budget equation is sc = τh. In equilibrium it must be that c = h,a n d
hence the government budget equation will imply s = τ. The household’s ﬁrst order
condition is:
[
1 − τ
1 − s
]u1(
1 − τ
1 − s
h,1 − h)=u2(
1 − τ
1 − s
h,1 − h) (4.3)
Substituting the equilibrium condition s = τ, this reduces to:
16u1(h,1 − h)=u2(h,1 − h) (4.4)
Note that the tax rate no longer appears in this expression. In fact, this is the same
expression that one would obtain in an economy with no government.
Under Program 4, the individual budget constraint is c =( 1− τ)h + b(1 − h),a n d
the government budget constraint is τh = b(1 − h).T h e ﬁrst order condition for the
household is
(1 − τ − b)u1((1 − τ − b)h + b,1 − h)=u2((1 − τ − b)h + b,1 − h) (4.5)
Feasibility implies that (1 − τ − b)h + b = h, and the government budget constraint
implies that b = τh/(1 − h). Substitution then gives:
(1 −
τ
1 − h
)u1(h,1 − h)=u2(h,1 − h) (4.6)
A few comments are in order. Although the expression for Program 2 includes τ,i t
is easy to show that if preferences are consistent with balanced growth then hours are
actually independent of τ and are the same as would occur in the competitive equilib-
rium without government. A similar result holds for Program 3, with two diﬀerences.
First, the fact that hours are the same as in the competitive equilibrium without govern-
ment holds independently of whether preferences are consistent with balanced growth.
Second, not only is the time allocation the same as in the competitive equilibrium with
no government, but the consumption allocation is identical as well. Under Program 2,
if resources are thrown away then the consumption allocation (and hence welfare) is
diﬀerent, even though the time allocated to work is the same.
Lastly, it is of interest to contrast the expressions for Program 1 and Program 4.
These expressions are similar except that the τ on the left hand side is divided by 1−h
for Program 4. Since h is positive, it follows that Program 4 is like Program 1 except
that the eﬀective tax is higher. The reason that the level of the eﬀective tax depends
on h is that to translate a subsidy on leisure to a tax on labor one must know the ratio
of labor to leisure.
The above analysis considered each spending program in isolation. It is very straight-
forward to generalize the above analysis to consider a situation in which all four pro-
grams are present. Given that we assume a proportional tax on labor income, we can
simply attach a tax rate τi to each program i,f o ri =1 ,2,3,4, and assume that each
program operates with its own budget constraint. Speciﬁcally, we require that T = τ1h,
sc = τ3h,a n db(1 − h)=τ4h. Carrying out an analysis similar to that above, one
obtains:
(1 − τ1 − τ2 −
τ4
1 − h
)u1((1 − τ2)h,1 − h)=u2((1 − τ2)h,1 − h) (4.7)
17If one picks preferences consistent with balanced growth then u2/u1 is linear in consump-
tion and hence the (1−τ2) term can be factored out from inside the utility function to
yield:
(1 − τ1 − τ2 −
τ4
1 − h
)u1(h,1 − h)=( 1− τ2)u2(h,1 − h) (4.8)
This expression tells us that there is an interaction between the various programs.
Previously, we noted that with balanced growth preferences, if all spending corresponded
to Program 2, then there was no eﬀect of tax rates on hours of market work. This is
no longer true if either τ1 or τ4 is positive, since it is easily seen that the (1−τ2) term
will not cancel on both sides in this case. In fact, as we see in the next section, for
empirically plausible values of τ1,t h ee ﬀect of τ2 on hours of work is substantial.
4.2. Quantitative Assessment
This subsection reports the results of some calculations carried out to explore the quan-
titative signiﬁcance of allowing for diﬀerences in government spending programs. As
before, I assume preferences are given by:
αlog(c)+( 1− α)
(1 − h)1−γ
1 − γ
.
We begin by contrasting the outcomes under Program 1 and Program 4, which basically
amounts to repeating the exercise carried out in Section 3 for Program 1. I focus on
the case of γ =1and in each case I calibrate the value of α so that when τ = .4 the
equilibrium entails h =1 /3. The calibrations under Program 1 and Program 4 will
therefore have diﬀerent values of α. Table 3 shows the results for relative hours as we
increase taxes within each spending program.
Table 3
Hours Relative to τ = .40
τ Program 1 Program 4
.40 1.00 1.00
.45 .94 .92
.50 .88 .83
.55 .82 .75
.60 .75 .67
.65 .68 .58
Under Program 4, which corresponds to leisure being subsidized, the elasticity of
hours with respect to the tax rate is more than 25% larger than it is under Program
1. Recall that hours worked in Continental Europe relative to the US are currently
approximately 2/3, and that tax rates in Continental Europe are about 20 percentage
points higher than in the US. The above calculations suggest that if we interpret all
18spending to correspond to Program 1, then taxes can account for about three-quarters
of the diﬀerences in hours of work, while if we interpret all spending to correspond to
Program 4, then taxes can account for virtually the entire diﬀerence.
In the above calculation, it is assumed that all spending in both the US and the
other country corresponds to the same program type. It is also of interest to consider
the case where the marginal increases in spending in one economy relative to another
are of a diﬀerent type. For example, suppose as above that we interpret all spending in
the US to reﬂect Program 1 and calibrate α accordingly. Now, however, suppose that
when we consider an economy with a higher tax rate, we assume that the entire increase
in tax rates is being used to ﬁnance subsidies to leisure rather than lump-sum transfers.
The eﬀect of this combination cannot be read directly from Table 2 since in that table
the value of α is diﬀerent for the diﬀerent columns. However, it turns out that this
eﬀect is very small and the results are virtually identical to those in the second column
of Table 2.
Next we consider economies with higher taxes than the US, and examine the eﬀect of
having these higher tax rates reﬂect diﬀerent combinations of expansions in consumption
subsidies or resources thrown away versus subsidies to leisure. This exercise assumes
that the US spending consists entirely of lump-sum transfers and that the other economy
has a lump-sum transfer program that is the same size in terms of the tax rate used
to ﬁnance it.13 For this exercise I assume that the alternative economy has a tax rate
that is 25 percentage points higher than the US rate, which is meant to capture the
magnitude of diﬀerences between the US and Scandinavia. The results are in Table 3.
Table 3
Eﬀects of Variations in Spending
Programs 3 and 4 Programs 2 and 4
τ3 τ4 h/hUS τ2 τ4 h/hUS
.00 .25 .58 .00 .25 .58
.05 .20 .67 .05 .20 .62
.10 .15 .75 .10 .15 .66
.15 .10 .83 .15 .10 .71
.20 .05 .92 .20 .05 .77
.25 .00 1.00 .25 .00 .84
The ﬁrst three columns examine the case where the incremental taxation involves
diﬀering mixes of Programs 3 and 4, while the last three columns consider the case
where the incremental taxation involves diﬀering mixes of Programs 2 and 4. I begin
with the ﬁrst case. To focus the discussion it is useful to consider whether changes in
this mix can account for the fact that Scandinavia has both higher tax rates and higher
hours worked than Continental Europe. It was noted earlier that if Continental Europe
13The results are unaﬀected by assuming that the benchmark system is a combination of programs as
opposed to being entirely a lump-sum transfer program. This changes the calibrated value of α, but this
has virtually no eﬀect on the quantitative eﬀect of given marginal changes in tax rates and spending.
19had all of its incremental taxation associated with ﬁnancing subsidies to leisure, then a
tax rate that is 20 percentage points higher than in the US would in fact account for the
fact that Continental Europe has hours of work equal to roughly 2/3 of the US value.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 indicate that if Scandinavia used 60 percent of its
incrementally higher taxation to ﬁnance subsidies to consumption with the rest going
to subsidize leisure, then the model would be able to account for relative hours of work
in both sets of economies. With this spending composition, Program 3 spending would
amount to approximately 23% of overall government spending, or roughly 15% of total
consumption.
Next I consider the case in which the incremental taxation takes the form of Pro-
grams 2 and 4. Looking at the last three columns, we see that this case would require
a larger compositional diﬀerential in order to reconcile hours of work in both sets of
economies, with more than 80 percent of the incremental spending going toward activ-
ities that do not beneﬁt the consumer, or more generally, do not aﬀect the marginal
utility of private consumption. This would require that Program 2 spending would
amount to roughly 30% of total government spending. These last three columns also
reveal the extent to which there is an interaction eﬀect between spending programs. As
noted previously, if there were no other spending programs in place, then with log-log
preferences there would be no eﬀect on hours associated with Program 2. If this were
true in the presence of other programs then the last entry in the ﬁnal column of Table
3 would be equal to 1.00. However, as one can see, the entry in this position is .84,
implying an elasticity of hours worked with respect to τ2 of more than .5.
4.3. Discussion
The above analysis illustrates that the connection between τ and h is highly dependent
on how the government revenues that are generated by the tax τ are spent. If they are
used to ﬁnance a subsidy to consumption, as in Program 3, then there will be no eﬀect
of τ on h. Similarly, with balanced growth preferences, this same result will occur if
the government uses all of the revenue to ﬁnance something which has no impact on
the marginal utility of either the consumption good c or leisure, as in Program 2. We
note speciﬁcally for future purposes that in this model with only one good, it does not
matter if the government oﬀers a lump-sum transfer of purchasing power (Program 1)
or a lump-sum transfer of the consumption good. And ﬁnally, if the revenue is spent
subsidizing leisure, as in Program 4, then the eﬀect on h will be larger than if the tax
proceeds are rebated in a lump-sum fashion.
The description of diﬀerent methods for transferring tax revenue back to households
has been both simple and abstract. In the real world there are a large number of
programs that accomplish this task of transferring tax revenue back to households, and
these programs are usually described by many details regarding the circumstances under
which revenue is transferred and how large the transfer is. As a result it is probably often
20the case that a given program does not necessarily ﬁt completely with any one of these
variations, but is better captured as a combination. But, as noted earlier, it is easy to
list programs that display the general characteristics of the programs just analyzed. For
example, unemployment insurance programs, social security programs and traditional
welfare programs all involve a transfer of resources that is conditional upon not engaging
in market work and hence implicitly involve marginal subsidies to leisure. Governments
subsidize a variety of consumption activities, either explicitly or through the tax code.
And there are many in-kind or cash transfers that are not necessarily linked to time
devoted to market work, such as education, health and sometimes housing.
In view of this it is of interest to ask whether diﬀerences in how governments spend
tax revenues may be signiﬁcant in reconciling the tax and market work patterns doc-
umented in Section 2. One prominent diﬀerence in spending patterns between the
economies of Scandinavia and those of continental Europe is that government spending
in the former countries on family services is much larger. In particular, Scandinavian
governments spend much more money on child care and elderly care. According to
Ragan (2005), government spending on these services is roughly 8% of total spending
on consumption, as opposed to roughly 2% in continental Europe. While the diﬀerences
in spending on family services is substantial, it is somewhat less than what would be
required to reconcile the diﬀerences in hours of work in Scandinavia and Continental
Europe. The results in Table 3 suggested that 60% of the tax revenue from the 25%
higher taxes would have to go to these types of services, which would correspond to a
share of 15% of total consumption.
The government employment channel is also potentially signiﬁcant. According to
the numbers from Algan et al. (2002), in 2000 the ratio of government employment
to total population aged 15-64 was 15% in the US, 18% in continental Europe and
28% in Scandinavia. The diﬀerence in employment to population ratios in Scandinavia
and Continental Europe is approximately 10% and hours per worker in employment
are roughly equal, so that if all of the additional government employment in Sweden
were wasteful this alone would account for much of the diﬀerence. However, given that
much of the additional government employment is associated with services provided by
the government such as child care and elderly care, this extreme scenario also seems
somewhat unlikely. But given that the family services component seems to account
for about half of the diﬀerence, it follows that if half of the additional government
employment (or about one-sixth of total government employment) were wasteful, that
the combination of features could account for the diﬀerences between Scandinavia and
Continental Europe.
Based on these calculations, I conclude that the mechanisms explored in this section
can perhaps go much of the way to reconciling the tax rates and hours of work in Scan-
dinavia and continental Europe. More deﬁnitive quantitative conclusions will require
a more detailed assessment of the diﬀerences in composition of government spending
vis-a-vis the taxonomy oﬀered in this section, which I leave for future work. The next
21section considers a multi-sector model of time allocation that allows us to understand
the sectoral diﬀerences documented in Section 2.
5. A Multi-Sector Model
In this section I extend the previous model along two key dimensions. First, I distinguish
between two diﬀerent market activities: the production of family services (i.e., child care
and elderly care) versus the production of all other goods and services in the market
sector.14 Second, I distinguish between two uses of time not devoted to market work:
leisure and the production of family services. A key assumption is that the output
of family services in the home sector is highly substitutable with market produced
family services. This model allows for a richer description of government policy, and in
particular allows us to incorporate one of the key distinguishing features of government
spending programs in Scandinavia relative to other countries: these countries devote a
much larger share of government spending to caring for children and the elderly. In the
model developed here, even if the government uses all tax revenues to fund lump-sum
transfers, it matters whether the transfer is in the form of general purchasing power or
in terms of units of family services, assuming that these transfers must be consumed by
the individual that receives them.
After developing the model I report the ﬁndings from some illustrative calculations.
Two main conclusions emerge. First, this setting can yield quantitatively signiﬁcant
eﬀects associated with government spending on family services. Second, this model
also sheds light on why the employment diﬀerences between Continental Europe and
Scandinavia are dominated by diﬀerences in service sector employment.
I begin by describing the extended model. For simplicity I assume functional forms
from the outset. The representative household now has preferences given by:
αc log(c)+αf log(f)+
(1 − αc − αf)
(1 − γ)
(1 − h)1−γ (5.1)
where c is consumption of a general purpose good similar to the previous case, f is the
consumption of family services that we will interpret to be care for children and the
elderly, and (1−h) is leisure. As before there is a linear technology, normalized to have
unit marginal product, that uses labor to produce output. I will interpret this output as
market output and write the production function function as y = hm,w h e r ehm is the
time devoted to producing this good and y is the amount of (market) output produced.
This output y has two uses. Similar to before, it can be converted one for one into
the consumption good c. However, it can also be used as an input into the production
of family services f. Household time is the other input into the production of family
14A richer model would include a larger set of consumption goods and services. In particular, it
would be of interest to explicitly consider other services (e.g., restaurants) which have good nonmarket
substitutes but which are not subsidized in any way by Scandinavian social policies. I leave this fuller
analysis for future work.
22services, and we write the production function as
f =[ amρ +( 1− a)h
ρ
f]1/ρ,
where m is the input of the market output and hf is the input of household time. The
motivation for this speciﬁcation is that I want to capture the fact that family services
may be provided through the market or the home. Since m is produced using market
time one can also think of this relation as specifying that family services are produced
using two diﬀerent time inputs—market time and nonmarket time. As we will see, central
to the analysis is the extent to which individuals can substitute among these two inputs
into the production of family services. Because of this I have chosen a constant elasticity
of substitution production function.
T h eg o v e r n m e n tt a x e sl a b o rm a r k e ti n c o m ea tr a t eτ, but I now allow for two possible
uses of this government revenue. As before, one use will be to fund a lump sum transfer
T. In what follows this can be thought of either as a transfer of purchasing power or
as a transfer of the all-purpose consumption good c. However, the other use will be
to fund a lump sum transfer of the market input into the provision of family services,
which I will denote by G. The household seeks to maximize its utility function above
subject to the constraints:
c + m =( 1− τ)hm + T (5.2)
f =[ a(m + G)ρ +( 1− a)h
ρ
f]1/ρ
m ≥ 0,c≥ 0,h m ≥ 0,h f ≥ 0,h m + hf ≤ 1
As we will see later, it will be particularly signiﬁcant to note the non-negativity con-
straint on m, which is to say that the government transfer of G is irreversible—it cannot
be sold in the market and turned into the consumption good c. The government budget
constraint in this economy is
T + G = τhm (5.3)
5.1. Household Problem
It is instructive to consider the household problem taking the government policy para-
meters as given. Substituting the constraints into the household’s objective functions
yields the following ﬁrst order conditions for hm, hf,a n dm respectively, assuming an
interior solution:
αc(1 − τ)
c
=( 1− αc − αf)(1 − hm − hf)−γ (5.4)
23αf(1 − a)
fρ h
ρ−1
f =( 1− αc − αf)(1 − hm − hf)−γ (5.5)
αc
c
=
αf
fρ a(m + G)ρ−1 (5.6)
Combined with the budget constraint and the production function for f we have ﬁve
equations in ﬁve unknowns. The interpretation of these conditions is straightforward.
The ﬁrst equation says that at the margin the value of time spent working in the market
is equal to the value of leisure. Similarly, the second equation says that at the margin,
the value of time spent providing family services is also equal to the value of leisure. And
the third equation says that at the margin, the household equates the value of spending
on the consumption good with spending on market inputs into family services.
5.2. Quantitative Assessment
I do not carry out a general analysis of government policy in the context of this model.
Instead, my goal is simply to carry out some calculations which are suggestive regarding
t h eq u a n t i t a t i v es i g n i ﬁcance of the mechanism studied. I begin by redoing the calcula-
tions carried out previously, but in the context of the new model. Speciﬁcally, I calibrate
the model to US data assuming that the US has government policy characterized by
τ = .40 as before, and G =0 , then produce a table equivalent to that of Table One in
which τ is varied while maintaining G =0 . We then consider how changes in G aﬀects
those results.
The benchmark calibration for the US economy sets τ = .40 and G =0 ,w i t hT
taking on whatever value is needed to balance the government budget. The elasticity
of substitution parameter ρ in the production function for family services is set to .8.
This value is chosen to reﬂect that there is substantial substitutability between home
and market inputs into the production of family services.15 The remaining preference
parameters are αc, αf and α. These values are determined by requiring that the equilib-
rium match the following statistics: hm =1 /3, hf = .08,a n dm/(c + m)=.025.G i v e n
hm =1 /3,t h ev a l u eo fhf is motivated by data from the ATUS for 2003, on the total
amount of time devoted to care for family members relative to time devoted to market
work. The share of total consumption spending devoted to family services is the same
as that used by Ragan (2005), and is chosen to match the corresponding spending share
for the US.16
15There are now several estimates of the parameter ρ. Using macro data, McGrattan et al (1997) ﬁnd
a value slightly greater than .4, while Chang and Schorfheide (2003) ﬁnd a value of around .5. Using
micro data, Rupert et al (1995) ﬁnd a value around .4, while Aguiar and Hurst (2005) ﬁnd a value of
around .6. I use a value larger than these estimates because of the focus on a narrow set of goods which
would seem to exhibit much higher substitutability.
16The results are not very sensitive to this value. When this share was calibrated to .05 instead of
.025 the results were almost identical.
24Table 4 reports the results that are analogous to those in Table 1, except that I now
include the eﬀects on a wider range of variables since the model now has several new
margins of interest.
Table 4
Eﬀects of Taxes Relative to τ = .4,W i t hG =0
τ hm hf hm + hf m c f
.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
.50 .87 1.14 .92 .46 .88 1.03
.60 .73 1.27 .83 .17 .74 1.08
.70 .58 1.38 .73 .04 .59 1.14
Comparing with Table 1 the reader will notice that the eﬀects of a given tax increase
on hours of market work is now slightly larger than before. The reason for this is that we
have added a home production sector. As is standard in the home production literature,
market hours respond more to a given tax change because there is an additional margin
of substitution—in addition to substituting from market work into leisure the individuals
can now substitute from market work into home work, which in this context means
increasing time devoted to the production of family services.17
A few simple patterns emerge. As expected, as taxes increase, households substitute
away from market activities into other activities. As a result, hm, c,a n dm all fall.
Both leisure and hf rise. Although m falls, the overall eﬀect is that f increases.
Next we examine the consequences of changing the mix of government spending.
For this analysis I will focus on the τ = .60 case and examine how G inﬂuences the
equilibrium. As noted earlier, if G is less than or equal to the value of m in the
equilibrium with τ = .60 and G =0 , then a marginal increase in G will have no eﬀect
on allocations or welfare, since the household will simply reduce m one-for-one with
t h ei n c r e a s ei nG, and use these funds to purchase c to make up for the decrease in
T implied by the government budget constraint. In the equilibrium with τ = .60 and
G =0 ,t h ev a l u eo fm is .001. Recall that in the τ = .40 equilibrium the calibrated
value of m is .008.
Table 5
Eﬀects of G When τ = .60, Relative to τ = .40
G = .00 G = .01 G = .02 G = .03
hm .73 .76 .79 .82
hf 1.27 1.11 .97 .85
hm + hf .83 .83 .83 .83
m + G .17 1.21 2.42 3.64
c .74 .75 .75 .75
f 1.08 1.19 1.24 1.27
17Rogerson (2005) considers a home production model in which the home sector provides a good
substitute for the market service sector, and also ﬁnds that the response of market work to taxes is
greater. McGrattan et al (1997) study the eﬀect of taxes on hours of work in the business cycle context.
25To ﬁx ideas, think of the ﬁrst column as representing the continental Europe sce-
nario, though as emphasized earlier in the paper one might want to consider variations
on government spending which include a subsidy to leisure. Comparing this column
with the other columns allows one to assess how changes in G aﬀect the Scandinavian
economies relative to the continental European economies.
We begin by noting the general qualitative patterns. As noted before, the ﬁrst
column shows that when tax rates increase and all revenue is rebated in a lump-sum
fashion there is a shift away from market work and market consumption toward non-
market work, nonmarket consumption and leisure. Non market time spent producing
family services increases as does total consumption of family services, though market
inputs into the production of family services goes down substantially.
As we increase G we see that time is allocated away from nonmarket work into
market work, and that leisure remains almost constant. The increase in G is obviously
associated with an increasing input of market inputs into the production of family
services. Although the input of nonmarket time into this activity is decreasing, the
net eﬀect is still an increase in the total consumption of family services. Note also that
consumption of the market good is basically constant. Although individuals are working
more and tax rates are the same, the transfer payment T received by households from
the government is decreasing in order to allow for the increased spending on family
services. By explicitly increasing the use of market inputs in the production of family
services the government is directly aﬀecting one of the distortions brought about by
higher tax rates in the ﬁrst place.
Next we focus on the quantitative ﬁndings. Of particular interest is the issue of
market work. Moving from G =0to G = .02 ones sees that market work relative
to the τ = .4 economy increases by about 6%. When going from G =0to G = .03
the equivalent ﬁgure is 9%. This is almost the same diﬀerence between Scandinavia
and Continental Europe seen in the data. When G = .02, the time input into the
production of family services is roughly the same as it is in the τ = .4 economy, though
total consumption of family services is roughly 25%. Total spending on market inputs
into the production of family services is almost two and a half times larger in this
economy than in the τ = .4 economy.
As noted earlier, government expenditure on family services in Scandinavia is ap-
proximately 8% of total consumption expenditures, which is roughly what is implied by
G = .02. I conclude that the above analysis depicts a mechanism that can potentially
help to reconcile much of the behavior of hours of market work and tax rates across
the three groups of countries studied. The eﬀects of spending on family services in this
model is somewhat larger than in the cases studied in the previous section. The key
is that in the current setting transfers of family services yield close to a one-for-one
transfer of time spent in non-market production into time spent in market production.
Additionally, even when these transfers are relatively small in aggregate terms, they can
lead to more market activity in the production of family services than is present in the
26US economy. As a result, this instrument can have a relatively large impact on hours
of market work.
Although when G = .03 we see that the level of market spending on family services
is more than twice as large as it is in the benchmark (US) economy, the benchmark
economy assumes a tax rate of .40, which creates an incentive for family services to
be provided outside of the market. In view of this it is of interest to ask what is the
eﬃcient level for the market provision of family services. This can be computed by
solving for the equilibrium of the calibrated model when τ =0 .T h er e s u l ti st h a tt h e
l e v e lo ff a m i l ys e r v i c e sp r o v i d e di nt h em a r k et would be more than 5 times higher than in
the benchmark economy with τ = .4, and nonmarket time devoted to producing family
services would be only 40% of its level in the benchmark equilibrium. These implications
are distinct from those obtained by Rosen (1996). He argued that Scandinavian social
policies led Scandinavians to consume many more of these services than is eﬃcient and
thus represented a large welfare loss.
It is of interest to quantify the welfare eﬀects of these policies. The measure of
welfare loss is the percentage amount by which c (non-family services consumption)
would have to be increased across two situations in order to yield equal utility for the
representative household. The welfare loss of having τ = .6 and G =0relative to the
τ = .4 and G =0benchmark is 14.9%. Keeping τ = .6 but considering increases in G
to .01, .02,a n d.03 lowers this welfare loss to 13.6%, 12.8%,a n d12.4% respectively. It
follows that some government provision of family services does represent a welfare gain
relative to the alternative of simply rebating all tax revenues as a lump-sum transfer,
though they only oﬀset a small portion of the overall welfare cost associated with higher
taxes.
Finally, it is important to note that the multi-sector analysis of this section and the
particular mechanism analyzed also sheds light on why the diﬀerences in hours of work
between Scandinavia and Continental Europe are so concentrated in the service sector
as opposed to being spread across all activities. Since consumption of the general good
is approximately the same for all values of G considered, it follows that hours devoted
to these other activities are basically the same in Scandinavia and Continental Europe.
6. Conclusion
The main point of this paper is a simple one. In trying to understand the eﬀects of
tax rates on hours of market work, it is essential to explicitly consider how the tax
revenues are being spent. Diﬀerent choices regarding government spending lead to
diﬀerent elasticities of hours of work with regard to tax rates. I illustrate the empirical
importance of this point by addressing the issue of hours worked and tax rates in three
sets of economies: the US, Continental Europe and Scandinavia. While tax rates are
highest in Scandinavia, hours worked in Scandinavia are signiﬁcantly higher than they
are in Continental Europe. I argue that key diﬀerences in government spending can
27potentially account for much of this pattern.
The analysis carried out here suggests an explanation for why it is that the increases
in government since 1960 have apparently had much larger eﬀects on hours of work in
Continental Europe than in Scandinavia. Although both sets of economies increased
taxes to fund much larger government spending, Scandinavia allocated its government
spending in a manner that implied much smaller elasticities of hours worked with regard
to tax increases.
The analysis carried out here is really only a ﬁrst step in assessing the quantitative
importance of the issues raised. Richer models of government spending programs will be
required in order to make further headway. This will probably require richer models on
the consumer side, since many programs have important interactions with heterogeneity
across consumers, along dimensions of income, age, marital status, and health status.
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